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L. L. Herman* Nuclear Tests Case:
Australia v. France;'
New Zealand v. France
2
In two separate judgments of December 20, 1974, the majority
of the International Court of Justice3 held that the objectives of both
Australia and New Zealand in ending French nuclear testing in the
South Pacific had been accomplished by virtue of various public
announcements made on behalf of the French government that,
following the conclusion of the 1974 series of tests, France would
revdrt to underground testing. Since the objectives of both
applicants had been accomplished, and consequently the issues had
been resolved, the Court was of the view that it was no longer called
upon to give a decision thereon. As noted by the Court in the
Australia case,
The Court finds that no further pronouncement is required in
the present case. It does not enter into the adjudicatory
functions of the Court to deal with issues in abstracto, once it has
reached that conclusion that the merits of the case no longer fall
to be determined. The object of the claim having clearly
disappeared, there is nothing on which to give judgement.
4
The reason for this finding was that France had, by virtue of a
statement made by the President of the Republic at a Press
Conference and by his office through a communiqu6, stated it was
reverting to underground testing. The Court referred to further
statements by the French Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence
that following the conclusions of the 1974 series of tests, France
would cease atmospheric nuclear testing. This, the majority opinion
holds, was the prime aim of Australia and, on the basis of these
*L. L. Herman, Legal Advisory Division, Department of External Affairs Ottawa.
The views expressed in this comment are those of the author and do not
neccessarily represent the views of his Department.
I. [1974]I.C.J. 253
2. Id. at 547.
3. President Lachs, and Judges Forster, Gros, Petrn, Ignacio-Pinto, Bengzon,
Morozov, Nagendra Singh, Ruda concurred in the majority judgement. Judges
Onyeama, Dillard, Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, deCastro, Waldock and Judge ad hoc
Barwick dissented.
4. Id. at 27 1. The judgements in both the Australia and New Zealand cases parallel
one another, and while there are some significant differences between the two
cases, this comment will centre on the reasons of the Court in the Australia case.
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assurances, the objective of Australia had been accomplished.
Therefore, the Court was faced with the situation in which the
objective of the applicant had in effect been accomplished,
inasmuch as the Court found that France had undertaken the
obligation to hold no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere in the
South Pacific.
5
The treatment by the majority of the application and submission
of Australia is noteworthy. It is interesting that, without any express
request or argument so directed, they interpreted the submission of
Australia on the basis of diplomatic correspondence from Australia
to France and of statements made by the Australian Attorney
General during the course of oral arguments before the Court to the
effect that Australia would only be satisfied in its claim if France
assured it that it would discontinue further nuclear testing.6 In view
of the clear intent reflected in the wording of the Application, which
on its face asks the Court to decide that the carrying out of further
atmospheric tests in the South Pacific Ocean is not consistent with
applicable rules of international law, is this not a somewhat unusual
procedure for the Court to follow? The same holds true with even
more force in the New Zealand case, since here the application, more
specific in its formulation, asks for a declaration that nuclear tests
were "a violation of New Zealand's rights under international law,
and that these rights will be violated by any such further tests". In
asserting its capacity to so treat the Application, the majority state
that it is the Court's duty to isolate the real issue in the case and to
identify the object of the claim7 and in doing so, not to confine itself
to the ordinary meaning of the words used. Further, the majority
holds, the Court must take into account the Application as a whole,
the arguments of the Applicant before the Court, the diplomatic
exchanges brought to the Court's attention and public statements
made on behalf of the applicant Government. 8
5. Id. at 270.
6. Referring to a communiqu6 dated June 8, 1974, issued from the Office of the
President of France advising that France was reverting to underground testing after
its current series of atmospheric tests were completed, the Attorney-General had
stated, during oral submissions that "The concern of the Australian Government is
to exclude completely atmospheric testing. It has repeatedly sought assurances that
atmospheric tests will end. It has not received those assurances. The recent French
Presidential statement cannot be read as a firm, explicit and binding undertaking to
refrain from further atmospheric tests." Id. at 261.
7. Id. at262.
8. Id. at 263.
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As much strength as there may appear to be in these justifications,
it must however, be seriously questioned whether, in the absence of
specific argument directed to the point, the Court could boldly
assert that the "ultimate objective" of Australia was a termination
of atmospheric testing and that therefore its claim cannot be
regarded as a claim for a declaratory judgment.9 This, in light of
the Australian Application which "asks the Court to adjudge and
declare" (emphasis added) that the carrying out of further tests by
France is not consistent with applicable rules of international law,
would appear to be a reformulation of a specific request by a litigant
for a declaration as to the legal relationship between the parties. Can
it therefore be conclusively stated that Australia's claim had been
satisfied? Counsel for Australia had never said as much, although
the majority seems to so think. Was not Australia requesting a
declaration as to the nature of France's actions in international law
were it to carry out further atmospheric testing?
A further ground upon which the judgment of the majority may
also be the subject of interest is its conclusion that there was a legal
obligation undertaken by the Government of France as a result of
the public statements made by the President and other Ministers. It
was on the basis of these statements that the Court was able to
reason that the totality of Australia's claim had been satisfied. The
Court held that,
in announcing that the 1974 series of atmosperic tests would be
the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at large,
including the applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these
tests. It was bound to assume that other states might take note of
these statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of
these statements and their legal consequences must be considered
within the general frame of the security of international
intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in
relations among states. It is from the actual substance of these
statements and from the circumstances attending their making,
that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced.
The objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed
to the international community as a whole, and the Court holds
that they constitute an undertaking possessing legal effect.
(Emphasis added)10
This is certainly an interesting proposition. While largely obiter
dicta, it is an attempt to enunciate a significant principle in
9. Id. at 263.
10. Id. at 269.
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international law. It can be expected that its application in other
areas may run into difficulty. When and at what point do statements
by Government leaders on national policy constitute legal
obligations? Cannot a Government change its policy? Are not legal
obligations among states primarily based upon intention to enter
into legal obligations, an intention that was evidenced in the Eastern
Greenland case but no evidenced here?1 In the latter case, the
statement made by the Norwegian foreign Minister was "definitive
and conclusive" regarding the intention of Norway not to make any
difficulties over the claim by Denmark to sovereignty over
Greenland. In the present case, are there compelling grounds for
concluding that, in reply to Australian requests, (which were
contained in a series of communications and statements) there was a
"definitive and conclusive" statement made on behalf of the
Government of France? It should be recalled that none of the
relevant statements were directed to the Australian Government, but
were made to the public at large.
In spite of the foregoing, it may be helpful to consider the
practical significance of the case in a different light. It is obvious
that even the most steadfast believer in international settlement of
disputes would be aware that an undertaking by the court to examine
on its merits an issue of this magnitude, with the attendant risks of
politics influencing the weight of any decision they may arrive at
concerning the legality of these tests, was a task of uncertain
success. The Court in declining to consider the merits of the case, in
effect has stated that France was to be bound by their decision, in
much the same way as if the Court had decided on the merits of the
case in Australia's favor. Declaring resultant legal obligations
consequent on the French promise to suspend nuclear testing, the
Court has attempted to meet the long-term objectives of Australia
and New Zealand while at the same time, indicating that policy
11. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Perm. Ct. Int. Just.) (1933), Series A B
No.53 The case, involving a dispute over the sovereignty of Eastern Greenland
between Denmark & Norway, was resolved by the Permanent Court in favor of
Denmark. Denmark argued firstly that its sovereignty had historic foundations and
secondly that Norway had expressly recognized this sovereignty by, among other
acts, a statement made by the Norwegian foreign minister Mr. Ihlen "that the
Norwegian Government would not make any difficulties in the settlement of this
question". The Court held that a reply of this nature given by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs on behalf of his Government in response to a request by the
diplomatic representative of a foreign Power, in regard to a question falling within
his province, is binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs.
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decisions taken by one state in an issue of this scope, where each of
the parties were aware of its significance to the other, cannot be
without lasting force and effect. Indeed, some considerable judicial
pressure appears to have been directed to the French where the
Court declares,
Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties
is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an
international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. Thus
interested states may take cognizance of unilateral declarations
and place confidence in them, and are entitled to require the
obligations thus created be respected. 12
The arguments advanced by Judge Gros of France in his separate
opinion and in support of the majority cannot escape comment.
Judge Gros goes farther than the majority by asserting that there was
no justifiable dispute, ad initio, for the Court to determine. He
reviews the position of Australia during the 20 year history prior to
the dispute, and notes that by its conduct before 1972 Australia had
disqualified itself from claiming that its rights in international law
had been violated. Indeed, during the 1950's and early 1960's, he
notes, Australia had acquiesced in tests in the South Pacific by the
British and United States Governments. With the signing of the Test
Ban Treaty in 1963, the Australian attitude changed somewhat but
fell short of total and outright opposition, based on an assertion of
legal rights, to these tests. "The Applicant", he says, "has
endeavoured to present to the Court, as the object of a legal dispute,
a request for the prohibition of acts in which the Applicant has itself
engaged, or with which it has associated itself. . ."13 and, he does
not feel that, based on consistent state practice, Australia can now
not come before the Court claiming its rights have been violated. He
says,
The Applicant has disqualified itself by its conduct and may not
submit a claim based on a double standard of conduct and of law.
What was good for Australia along with the United Kingdom and
the United States, cannot be unlawful for other states. 14
State practice and evidence of consistent conduct, Judge Gros says,
transcend changes of government, and while governmental policy
may have been altered, the facts show a long history of
acquiescence and even cooperation as a matter of state conduct. In
12. [1974]I.C.J. 268
13. Id. at 284
14. Id. at 285
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effect, he seems to be postulating a "clean hands doctrine", so long
familiar in courts of Equity.
The strong dissenting opinion of four of the Court's judges should
be noted. Taking exception with the Court's re-interpretation of the
Australian submission, the four justices state that the true nature of
Australia's claims ought to be determined on the basis of the clear
and natural meaning of the text of its formal submission, which was
an unequivocal request of the Court for a judicial declaration on the
legality of the tests conducted by France. This was a case of a dual
submission - comprising both a request for a declaration of
illegality and a prayer for an order or injunction - and the fact that
the submission asks for some consequential relief should not be
used to set aside the basic submission. 15 The dissent rejects the
majority's approach of bringing other materials such as diplomatic
communications and statements made in the course of hearings and
governmental press statements into the proceedings as means of
interpreting the submission, which amounts to a revision of the text.
Moreover, they point out that if Australia's claim was satisfied by
the French assurances, then satisfaction ascribed to Australia could
only be shown by precise withdrawal or amendment of their
submission before the Court. 16
Moreover, Australia's claim was not satisfied by assurances by
France that it was going underground after 1974. What Australia
sought was a declaration as to the legality of French atmospheric
tests conducted as from the date of the Application, May 2, 1973. A
judicial declaration of illegality would therefore embrace those tests
which took place in 1973 and 1974, and, although not raised in the
submission, may be used as the basis for a claim to compensation.
The object, therefore, remained. 17 The most significant comment of
all by the minority, is their refutation of the "inherent" jurisdiction
of the Court as articulated by the majority claiming that it has the
discretionary power to take such action as may be required under the
circumstances and to ensure the best means by which justice should
be done to the parties. The court has not, the minority opinion
states,
. . . the discretionary power of choosing those contentious cases
it will decide and those it will not. . . In our view, for the Court
to discharge itself from carrying out that primary obligation must
15. Id. at315
16. Id. at317
17. Id. at 318-19.
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be considered as highly exceptional and a step to be taken only
when the most cogent considerations of judicial propriety so
require. In the present case we are very far from thinking any
such considerations exist. 18
The two cases will be the subject of considerable comment for a
time to come, and on the basis of many of the broad statements by
the Court as well as the strong dissent, it is difficult to anticipate
what weight the decision will have in international law. The
implications of the judgment as far as unilateral declarations which
amount to legal obligations is an important one for states to
consider. If the majority viewpoint is given credence, governmental
declarations should be carefully studied in light of the judgement, in
the hope that statement of intention reflecting government policy do
not amount to assumptions of irrevocable legal obligation on the
part of unsuspecting states.
18. Id. at 322.
